Hearings and Reports on the Evacuation Claims Bills

              and  competitors  buy articles  at  ridiculously low prices  -  $5.00 to  $10.00
for a good electric refrigerator;  $400 to $500 for $1,500 trucks.     Growing
crops  in the  field were  sold  either  at merely nominal prices   or  left to
be harvested  on the shares,  from which I  learned  later  nothing was
usually realized.     The  evacuees were  in a hopeless market position because  they were working against a dead  line and  the buyers realized
the nearer they approached that dead line, the   less they would have  to
pay for property because  of the  necessity of the   evacuees  of  disposing
of it in some way.
The  evacuees were unable to return  to   inspect  their property or to
seek justice  in the courts.     I knew  of instances where the   Caucasian
neighbors   or friends with whom property was  left discharged  their  trust
with great  fidelity,  but   these  cases  are  in the   great minority.
During  the trying days   of evacuation,  the  Japanese Americans  complied
with the  regulations with a minimum of trouble and  resistance.     They proved
by every test that they were  loyal and  law-abiding people that are  entitled
both by  law and by  Christian conscience  to some   compensation for the property
damages which they sustained as  the   result of the  evacuation orders.
Very large losses  of property by the  evacuees through the evacuation
procedure were  inevitable.     In the memorandum of February  20th,   1942,
by Mr.  McCloy,  Assistant Secretary  of War,   to Lt.  Gen.  DeWitt,   the  responsibility of government to protect the property rights  of  the evacuees
was stated, as follows:     "The protection of physical property  from theft
or other harm is primarily the   responsibility  of the State and   local  law
enforcement  officers  and you will doubtless  call upon them for maximum
assistance  in this  connection.    Where  they are unable  to protect physical property  left behind  in military areas,   the responsibility will be
yours  to provide reasonable  protection either through the  use of troops
or through other appropriate measures."     This   recognized the principle
of liability for protection of property rights  of the  evacuees, which was
never  fully assumed by the   Army.
In the  haste of the  evacuation procedure,   the  property interests
were  not protected from the   exploitation of greedy and unscrupulous   dealers.
Property that was   stored was often pillaged or subject to arson without
protection from local police.    Evacuees were helpless  to protect themselves  against theft and misuse  of their property by people who were  left
as  administrators.
As  a matter  of fact, there are  substantial  grounds  for believing
that the whole  relocation program was  tragically unnecessary.    Persons of
Japanese ancestry living  on the   Pacific   Coast were  the   first economic
casualties of the declaration of war,   following   Pearl  Harbor.    Subsequent
events  have amply justified the   opposition which was strongly urged at
the  time  against the   whole  evacuation procedure.     The   following facts
are  submitted to justify this  position:
(1) The  evacuation order was not issued by  Lt.  Gen. DeWitt until
March 2nd,   1942, which was  almost three months  after
Pearl Harbor.
(2) In the period  between December  7th,   1941,   and  March  2nd,   1942,
the   records  of the   intelligence  agencies   show no  case  of
sabotage  or espionage by persons of  Japanese  ancestry in the
United States;   and   the   same  holds  true   for the   duration of
the war period.
(3) Stories  circulated in the-  press about acts  of  sabotage  in
Hawaii  following  Pearl  Harbor, which created  such public
hysteria  on the   Pacific   Coast,  were   later  categorically denied
by responsible  Hawaiian officers.
(4) The way in which the  Japanese Americans  obeyed the  evacuation
orders without   strikes or  violence,   their behavior during the
92.