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nor the psychological burden of the direct experience of unjust exclusion and detention. \ The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from it — detention, ending detention and ending exclusion — were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II. Many of those involved in the exclusion, removal and detention passed judgment on those events in memoirs and other statements after the war. Henry Stimson recognized that "to loyal citizens this forced evacuation was a personal injustice." In his autobiography, Francis Biddle reiterated his beliefs at the time: "The program was ill-advised, unnecessary and unnecessarily cruel." Justice William O. Douglas, who joined the majority opinion in Korematsu which held the evacuation constitutionally permissible, found that the evacuation case "was ever on my conscience." Milton Eisenhower described the evacuation to the relocation camps as "an inhuman mistake." Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had urged evacuation as Attorney General of California, stated, "/ have since deeply regretted the removal order and my own testimony advocating it, because it was not in keeping with our American concept of freedom and the rights of citizens." Justice Tom C. Clark, who had been liaison between the Justice Department and the Western Defense Command, concluded, "Looking back on it today [the evacuation] was, of course, a mistake." 24 PART II: THE ALEUTS During the struggle for naval supremacy in the Pacific during WW II, the Aleutian Islands were strategically valuable to both the United States and Japan. Beginning in March 1942, U.S. military intelligence repeatedly warned Alaska defense commanders that Japanese aggression into the Aleutian Islands was imminent. In June 1942, the Japanese attacked and held the two westernmost Aleutians, Kiska and Attu. American military commanders ordered the evacuation of the Aleuts from many of the islands to places of relative safety. Eight hundred seventy-six Aleuts had been evacuated from Aleut villages west of Unimak Island, including the Pribilofs. Except in Unalaska the entire population of each village was evacuated, including at least 30 non-Aleuts. All of the Aleuts were relocated to southeastern Alaska except 50 persons who were either evacuated to the Seattle area or hospitalized in the Indian Hospital at Tacoma, Washington. The evacuation of the Aleuts had a rational basis as a precaution to ensure their safety. The Aleuts were evacuated from an active theatre of war; 42 were taken prisoner on Attu by the Japanese. It was clearly the military's belief that evacuation of non-military personnel was advisable. The Aleuts' Camps Aleuts were subjected to deplorable conditions following the evacuation. Typical housing was an abandoned gold mine or fish cannery buildings which were inadequate in both accommodation and sanitation. Lack of medical care contributed to extensive disease and death. The Funter Bay cannery in southeastern Alaska where 300 Aleuts were placed was one of the worst camps. The majority of evacuees were forced to live in two dormitory-style buildings in groups of six to thirteen people in areas of nine to ten feet square. Until fall, many Aleuts were forced to sleep in relays because of lack of space. In the fall of 1942, the only fulltime medical care was provided by two nurses who served both the cannery camp and a camp at 25
Object Description
Title | Personal Justice Denied |
Description | This document is a summary of the commission on wartime relocation and internment of civilians in World War II. |
Subjects | Redress and reparations |
Type | image |
Genre | Narrative |
Language | eng |
Collection | Hirasuna Family Papers |
Collection Description | 25 items |
Project Name | California State University Japanese American Digitization Project |
Rights | Rights not yet transferred |
Description
Local ID | csufr_hfp_1248 |
Project ID | csufr_hfp_1248 |
Title | Page 24 / 25 |
Creator | JACL |
Date Created | 1983 - 00 - 00 |
Subjects | Redress and reparations |
Type | image |
Genre | Narrative |
Language | eng |
Collection | Hirasuna Family Papers |
Collection Description | 10.91 x 8.39in |
Rights | Rights not yet transferred |
Transcript | nor the psychological burden of the direct experience of unjust exclusion and detention. \ The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from it — detention, ending detention and ending exclusion — were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II. Many of those involved in the exclusion, removal and detention passed judgment on those events in memoirs and other statements after the war. Henry Stimson recognized that "to loyal citizens this forced evacuation was a personal injustice." In his autobiography, Francis Biddle reiterated his beliefs at the time: "The program was ill-advised, unnecessary and unnecessarily cruel." Justice William O. Douglas, who joined the majority opinion in Korematsu which held the evacuation constitutionally permissible, found that the evacuation case "was ever on my conscience." Milton Eisenhower described the evacuation to the relocation camps as "an inhuman mistake." Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had urged evacuation as Attorney General of California, stated, "/ have since deeply regretted the removal order and my own testimony advocating it, because it was not in keeping with our American concept of freedom and the rights of citizens." Justice Tom C. Clark, who had been liaison between the Justice Department and the Western Defense Command, concluded, "Looking back on it today [the evacuation] was, of course, a mistake." 24 PART II: THE ALEUTS During the struggle for naval supremacy in the Pacific during WW II, the Aleutian Islands were strategically valuable to both the United States and Japan. Beginning in March 1942, U.S. military intelligence repeatedly warned Alaska defense commanders that Japanese aggression into the Aleutian Islands was imminent. In June 1942, the Japanese attacked and held the two westernmost Aleutians, Kiska and Attu. American military commanders ordered the evacuation of the Aleuts from many of the islands to places of relative safety. Eight hundred seventy-six Aleuts had been evacuated from Aleut villages west of Unimak Island, including the Pribilofs. Except in Unalaska the entire population of each village was evacuated, including at least 30 non-Aleuts. All of the Aleuts were relocated to southeastern Alaska except 50 persons who were either evacuated to the Seattle area or hospitalized in the Indian Hospital at Tacoma, Washington. The evacuation of the Aleuts had a rational basis as a precaution to ensure their safety. The Aleuts were evacuated from an active theatre of war; 42 were taken prisoner on Attu by the Japanese. It was clearly the military's belief that evacuation of non-military personnel was advisable. The Aleuts' Camps Aleuts were subjected to deplorable conditions following the evacuation. Typical housing was an abandoned gold mine or fish cannery buildings which were inadequate in both accommodation and sanitation. Lack of medical care contributed to extensive disease and death. The Funter Bay cannery in southeastern Alaska where 300 Aleuts were placed was one of the worst camps. The majority of evacuees were forced to live in two dormitory-style buildings in groups of six to thirteen people in areas of nine to ten feet square. Until fall, many Aleuts were forced to sleep in relays because of lack of space. In the fall of 1942, the only fulltime medical care was provided by two nurses who served both the cannery camp and a camp at 25 |