Personal Justice Denied

              The ethnic Japanese, small in number and with no political
voice — the citizen generation was just reaching voting age in
1940 — had become a convenient target for political demo-
gogues. Political bullying was supported by organized interest
groups who adopted anti-Japanese agitation as a consistent part
of their program: the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden
West, the Joint Immigration Committee, the American Legion,the
California State Federation of Labor and the California State
Grange.
Second, Japanese armies in the Pacific won a rapid, startling
string of victories against the United States and its allies in the
first months of World War II. In January and February 1942, the
military position of the United States in the Pacific was perilous.
There was fear of Japanese attacks on the West Coast.
Next, contrary to the facts, there was a widespread belief, supported by a statement by Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, that
the Pearl Harbor attack had been aided by sabotage and fifth column activity by ethnic Japanese in Hawaii. The government knew
that this was not true, but took no effective measures to disabuse
public belief that disloyalty had contributed to massive American losses on December 7,1941. Thus the country was unfairly led
to believe that both American citizens of Japanese descent and
resident Japanese aliens threatened American security.
Fourth, as anti-Japanese organizations began to speak out and
rumors from Hawaii spread, West Coast politicians quickly took
up the familiar anti-Japanese cry. The Congressional delegations
in Washington organized themselves and pressed the War and
Justice Departments and the President for stern measures to control the ethnic Japanese — moving quickly from control of aliens
to evacuation and removal of citizens. In California, Governor
Olson, Attorney General Warren and Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles, and many local authorities joined the ciamor. These opinions
were not informed by any knowledge of actual military risks,
rather they were stroked by virulent agitation which encountered
little opposition. Only a few churchmen and academicians were
prepared to defend the Japanese. There was little or no political
risk in claiming that it was "better to be safe than sorry" and, as
many did, that the best way for ethnic Japanese to prove their
loyalty was to volunteer to enter detention. The press amplified
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the unreflective emotional excitement of the hour. Through late
January and early February 1942, the rising clamor from the West
Coast was heard within the federal government as its demands
became more draconian.
Making and justifying the Decision. The exclusion of the ethnic
Japanese from the West Coast was recommended to the
Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, by Lieutenant General John L.
DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command with responsibility for West Coast security. President
Roosevelt relied on Secretary Stimson's recommendations in
issuing Executive Order 9066.
The justification given for the measure was military necessity.
The claim of military necessity is most clearly set out in three
places: General DeWitf s February 14,1942, recommendation to
Secretary Stimson for exclusion; General DeWitf s Final Report
Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942; and the government's brief in the Supreme Court defending the Executive Order
in Hirabayashi v. United States. General DeWitf s February 1942