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— 3 — the group, the imposition of curfew regulation, one of the Justices of this Court has already stated: "The result is the creation in this country of two classes of citizens for the purposes of a critical and perilous hour—to sanction discrimination between groups of United States citizens on the basis of ancestry. In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power."3 In this opinion Mr. Justice Murphy made it clear that he was able to accept the validity of even this limited restriction only because he felt that "the military authorities could have reasonably concluded at the time that determinations as to the loyalty and dependability of individual members of the large and widely scattered group of persons of Japanese extraction on the West Coast could not be made without delay that might have had tragic consequences."4 But in his opinion Mr. Justice Murphy comes essentially to the same position as that which has been cited for Attorney General Biddle, namely, that the validity of orders and restrictions imposed by the military under the authority of the Executive Order depends upon the "reasonableness of its exercise." In regard to this he declares: "I do not wish to be understood as intimating that the military authorities in time of war are subject to no restraints whatsoever, so that they are free to impose any restrictions they may choose on the rights and liberties of individual citizens or groups of citizens in those places which may be designated as 'military areas.' While this Court sits, it has the inescapable duty of seeing that the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed. That duty exists in time of war as well as in time of peace, and.in its performance we must not forget that few indeed have been the invasions upon essential liberties which have not been accompanied by pleas of urgent necessity advanced in good faith by responsible men."5 The same line of reasoning runs through the opinion of the Court and the other concurring opinions. Speaking for the Court Mr. Chief Justice Stone said: "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection. We may assume that these considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas."6 The inference is that if relevant and available facts bearing upon the loyalties of elements of the population were not considered, if decisions were made on the basis of misinformation or misconception, if substantial evidence is produced of "Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, p. 111. 'Ibid., pp. 112-13. 'Ibid., p. ii3. 'Hirabayashi v. United States; Opinion of the Court, p. 100.
Object Description
Title | The Case For The Nisei |
Subjects | Identity and values--Nisei |
Type | image |
Genre | Books |
Language | eng |
Collection | Hirasuna Family Papers |
Collection Description | 113 items |
Project Name | California State University Japanese American Digitization Project |
Rights | Rights not yet transferred |
Description
Local ID | csufr_hfp_0744 |
Project ID | csufr_hfp_0744 |
Title | Page 3 |
Creator | Japanese American Citizens League |
Date Created | Unknown |
Subjects | Identity and values--Nisei |
Type | image |
Genre | Books |
Language | eng |
Collection | Hirasuna Family Papers |
Collection Description | 5.36 x 8.50in |
Rights | Rights not yet transferred |
Transcript | — 3 — the group, the imposition of curfew regulation, one of the Justices of this Court has already stated: "The result is the creation in this country of two classes of citizens for the purposes of a critical and perilous hour—to sanction discrimination between groups of United States citizens on the basis of ancestry. In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power."3 In this opinion Mr. Justice Murphy made it clear that he was able to accept the validity of even this limited restriction only because he felt that "the military authorities could have reasonably concluded at the time that determinations as to the loyalty and dependability of individual members of the large and widely scattered group of persons of Japanese extraction on the West Coast could not be made without delay that might have had tragic consequences."4 But in his opinion Mr. Justice Murphy comes essentially to the same position as that which has been cited for Attorney General Biddle, namely, that the validity of orders and restrictions imposed by the military under the authority of the Executive Order depends upon the "reasonableness of its exercise." In regard to this he declares: "I do not wish to be understood as intimating that the military authorities in time of war are subject to no restraints whatsoever, so that they are free to impose any restrictions they may choose on the rights and liberties of individual citizens or groups of citizens in those places which may be designated as 'military areas.' While this Court sits, it has the inescapable duty of seeing that the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed. That duty exists in time of war as well as in time of peace, and.in its performance we must not forget that few indeed have been the invasions upon essential liberties which have not been accompanied by pleas of urgent necessity advanced in good faith by responsible men."5 The same line of reasoning runs through the opinion of the Court and the other concurring opinions. Speaking for the Court Mr. Chief Justice Stone said: "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection. We may assume that these considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas."6 The inference is that if relevant and available facts bearing upon the loyalties of elements of the population were not considered, if decisions were made on the basis of misinformation or misconception, if substantial evidence is produced of "Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, p. 111. 'Ibid., pp. 112-13. 'Ibid., p. ii3. 'Hirabayashi v. United States; Opinion of the Court, p. 100. |