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—.44 —
lists were carefully compiled by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents
and submitted for thorough review to a comparatively unknown division,
at that time called the Special Defense Unit, whose chief function was the
planning of vigorous counter-measures in the event of war."175
Accordingly it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile General DeWitt's
"military necessity," which nothing less than total evacuation could satisfy,
with the confidence of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
that his unit had the situation under perfect control. Only July 18, 1942,
Director Hoover said:
"The attack on Pearl Harbor found the FBI completely mobilized on
a war-time basis and ready for any emergency. In the first twenty-four
hours after the attack more than 1,000 of the most dangerous enemy
aliens were rounded up."176
Director Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a realistic
man. His patriotism and good faith, too, must be assumed by this Court. If
the task of preventing sabotage and subversive activity along the coast without the intervention of the Army had been too great for him, we must assume
that he would have so stated. He has never done so. Attorney-General Biddle, too, can be assumed to be more concerned for the safety and victory of
this country than over his prerogatives. Yet all statements and reports that
these men have issued declare that the precautions and counter-measures they
applied were sufficient and successful.
Moreover, the record bears them out. Even if there had been sabotage
attempts and evidences of fifth column activity among resident Japanese, it is
not at all certain that evacuation would have been justified. We would need
then to ask whether the Intelligence services could not have crushed individual subversive activity and espionage rings among West Coast Japanese as
they did among Germans, Italians and native-born white Americans in various
parts of the country without dislocation of populations and mass evacuations.
But the transfer of authority to the Army and the extension to citizens of
controls which have hitherto been reserved for enemy aliens, occurred in the
total absence of any deterioration of the effectiveness of Department of Justice
control. There was no increase in sabotage attributable to persons of Japanese ancestry because no sabotage has ever been traced to a member of this
group. There was no increase in fifth column activity because no such activity
has been attributed to this group. On December 10, 1941, Attorney-General
Biddle asserted, "There has been absolutely no evidence of fifth column or
sabotage activities."177 In the joint release issued February 11, 1942, by the
Secretary of War and the Attorney-General on West Coast Control we are
told, "To date there has been no substantial evidence of sabotage by any
aliens."178 Yet three days later General DeWitt was to request unlimited au-
1KJames Rowe, Jr., "Alien Enemy Program—So Far," Commond Ground, Summer,
1942, p. 20.
"'New York Times, July 19, 1942. (United Press release from Washington, July I8,
1942.)
"'Ibid., December 11, 1941.
,78Z.os Angeles Japanese Daily News, February 11, 1942.
Object Description
| Title | The Case For The Nisei |
| Subjects | Identity and values--Nisei |
| Type | image |
| Genre | Books |
| Language | eng |
| Collection | Hirasuna Family Papers |
| Collection Description | 113 items |
| Project Name | California State University Japanese American Digitization Project |
| Rights | Rights not yet transferred |
Description
| Local ID | csufr_hfp_0786 |
| Project ID | csufr_hfp_0786 |
| Title | Page 44 |
| Creator | Japanese American Citizens League |
| Date Created | Unknown |
| Subjects | Identity and values--Nisei |
| Type | image |
| Genre | Books |
| Language | eng |
| Collection | Hirasuna Family Papers |
| Collection Description | 5.07 x 8.50in |
| Rights | Rights not yet transferred |
| Transcript | —.44 — lists were carefully compiled by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and submitted for thorough review to a comparatively unknown division, at that time called the Special Defense Unit, whose chief function was the planning of vigorous counter-measures in the event of war."175 Accordingly it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile General DeWitt's "military necessity," which nothing less than total evacuation could satisfy, with the confidence of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that his unit had the situation under perfect control. Only July 18, 1942, Director Hoover said: "The attack on Pearl Harbor found the FBI completely mobilized on a war-time basis and ready for any emergency. In the first twenty-four hours after the attack more than 1,000 of the most dangerous enemy aliens were rounded up."176 Director Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a realistic man. His patriotism and good faith, too, must be assumed by this Court. If the task of preventing sabotage and subversive activity along the coast without the intervention of the Army had been too great for him, we must assume that he would have so stated. He has never done so. Attorney-General Biddle, too, can be assumed to be more concerned for the safety and victory of this country than over his prerogatives. Yet all statements and reports that these men have issued declare that the precautions and counter-measures they applied were sufficient and successful. Moreover, the record bears them out. Even if there had been sabotage attempts and evidences of fifth column activity among resident Japanese, it is not at all certain that evacuation would have been justified. We would need then to ask whether the Intelligence services could not have crushed individual subversive activity and espionage rings among West Coast Japanese as they did among Germans, Italians and native-born white Americans in various parts of the country without dislocation of populations and mass evacuations. But the transfer of authority to the Army and the extension to citizens of controls which have hitherto been reserved for enemy aliens, occurred in the total absence of any deterioration of the effectiveness of Department of Justice control. There was no increase in sabotage attributable to persons of Japanese ancestry because no sabotage has ever been traced to a member of this group. There was no increase in fifth column activity because no such activity has been attributed to this group. On December 10, 1941, Attorney-General Biddle asserted, "There has been absolutely no evidence of fifth column or sabotage activities."177 In the joint release issued February 11, 1942, by the Secretary of War and the Attorney-General on West Coast Control we are told, "To date there has been no substantial evidence of sabotage by any aliens."178 Yet three days later General DeWitt was to request unlimited au- 1KJames Rowe, Jr., "Alien Enemy Program—So Far," Commond Ground, Summer, 1942, p. 20. "'New York Times, July 19, 1942. (United Press release from Washington, July I8, 1942.) "'Ibid., December 11, 1941. ,78Z.os Angeles Japanese Daily News, February 11, 1942. |
