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-2- tion of Japanese immigrants residing at that time In the United States who, because of Federal law, were not permitted to become U.S. citizens. After the initial plan for voluntary exclusion failed, these American citizens or legal residents were forcibly removed by the Army, first to assembly centers—makeshift quarters in fairgrounds and racetracks—and then to relocation centers. These latter camps, located in desolate Western areas, were surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by military police. The U.S. Government carried out Its policy without reviewing individual cases or providing due process of law. and continued its policy virtually without regard for Individuals who demonstrated loyalty to the United States. Congress made it a crime to violate Executive Order 9066. The U.S. Supreme Court—In one of its most agonizing decisions—held the removal constitutionally permissible because of the war. Interestingly, since that decision a number of Justices from the majority—enough to have reversed the 5-to-4 decision—have written that on hindsight, they would have voted differently. The Supreme Court in a related case struck down imprisonment of these admittedly loyal American citizens. But long after the fact. The Commission found that the main Impetus leading to the exclusion order was the mistaken notion that individuals of Japanese descent would be loyal to Japan, not to the United States, and groundless fears of fifth column activity even though no evidence of such activities could be uncovered. The Commission stated that "the record does not permit the conclusion that military necessity warranted the exclusion of the ethnic Japanese from the west coast." After exclusion became official policy, the War Relocation Authority [WRA1—the civilian agency charged with supervising the relocation—assumed that the vast majority of evacuees were loyal and should be allowed to resettle outside of the west coast. But because of harsh objections from certain mountain State politicians, a consensus plan for detention of the evacuees emerged. The WRA gave up on Its Idea of resettlement, and accepted a program of confinement. Despite WRA'5 belief that evacuees should be returned to normal productive life, it had, In effect, become their Jailer. Since there was no military Justification for detention, the WRA Instead contended that the program was for the evacuees' own safety. The history of life during the evacuation and In the relocation camps Is one of suffering and deprivation. On the average, families received only 1 or 2 weeks notice of evacuation to an unknown destination. They could take v, ith them only what could be carried. All else was lost or sold for cut-rate prices. Life in the relocation camps was spartan, with shoddy and crowded buildings, defective facilities, faulty heating, inadequate health care, and limited education programs. Privacy was Impossible. Families and individuals alike lost their Identities and became known only by identification numbers. Because the Western Defense Command opposed Individual loyalty reviews—for fear of weakening the blanket exclusion—no opportunity for Individual review was created In the assembly centers. The War Department fsvored conducting loyalty reviews, but did not act on this until the end of 1942. Although these reviews eventually permitted some to leave relocation centers, it didn't end the exclusion from the west coast. Moreover, even this belated process was offensive, since It treated Japanese Americans as guilty until proven Innocent. In the spring of 1943, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, and Gen. George C. Marshall reached the conclusion that the loyalty reviews eliminated any Justification for exclusion from the west coast. They kept their views private, however, and General DeWitt repeatedly opposed ending exclusion until he left the Western Defense Command in late 1943, as did west coast anti-Japanese fractions. Secretary Stimson finally put the recommendation before the Cabinet in May 1944. But no action was taken until December 7. 1944, while confinement continued for the great majority of Japanese Americans. The exclusion and removal of Japanese-Americans resulted from a long history of anti-Japanese-American agitation and legislation on the west coast. By contrast, In Hawaii, where the military commander restrained plans for radical measures and treated the ethnic Japanese as loyal residents—absent evidence to the contrary—only 2,000 ethnic Japanese were taken into custody. The policy developed was in sharp contrast to Government actions against enemy aliens or citizens of non-Japanese descent. For example, the United States never ordered a mass exclusion or detention against American citizens of German or Italian descent. This episode in American history should never have happened. It's the Government's responsibility to set the record straight and to try, at least, tc recognize and partially compensate for past injustices, although the tarnish on our Constitution can never be completely removed. Our purpose is to recognize and redress the injustices and violations of civil liberties against U.S. citizens and U.S. residents of Japanese and Aleut ancestry by the United States and to discourage similar Injustices and violations of civil liberties in the future. The bill provides for the establishment of a $1.5 billion trust fund from which individual payments to the surviving internees would be made. Those eligible are people of Japanese or Alaskan Aleut ancestry excluded from the west coast between December 7, 1941, and June 30. 1946. or deprived of liberty or property as a result of a series of Executive orders, proclamations, laws. Armed Forces directives, or other Federal actions resulting in exclusion, relocation, and/or detention of individuals on the basis of race. The remaining moneys In the trust fund would be utilized for humanitarian and public education efforts to preclude this event from occurring again in the future. This act is a Just and fair redress to those Individuals who were excluded and/or interned without justification. In gross violation of their civil liberties as American citizens and residents. I urge my colleagues to support It
Object Description
Title | Congressional Record |
Description | A collection of government documents is presented. In more specific, Congressional records from April 10, 1987. |
Subjects | Redress and reparations |
Type | image |
Genre | Government record |
Language | eng |
Collection | Hirasuna Family Papers |
Collection Description | 2 items |
Project Name | California State University Japanese American Digitization Project |
Rights | Rights not yet transferred |
Description
Local ID | csufr_hfp_0856 |
Project ID | csufr_hfp_0856 |
Title | Page 2 |
Creator | Unknown |
Date Created | 1987 - 09 - 17 |
Subjects | Redress and reparations |
Type | image |
Genre | Government record |
Language | eng |
Collection | Hirasuna Family Papers |
Collection Description | 7.87 x 10.91in |
Rights | Rights not yet transferred |
Transcript | -2- tion of Japanese immigrants residing at that time In the United States who, because of Federal law, were not permitted to become U.S. citizens. After the initial plan for voluntary exclusion failed, these American citizens or legal residents were forcibly removed by the Army, first to assembly centers—makeshift quarters in fairgrounds and racetracks—and then to relocation centers. These latter camps, located in desolate Western areas, were surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by military police. The U.S. Government carried out Its policy without reviewing individual cases or providing due process of law. and continued its policy virtually without regard for Individuals who demonstrated loyalty to the United States. Congress made it a crime to violate Executive Order 9066. The U.S. Supreme Court—In one of its most agonizing decisions—held the removal constitutionally permissible because of the war. Interestingly, since that decision a number of Justices from the majority—enough to have reversed the 5-to-4 decision—have written that on hindsight, they would have voted differently. The Supreme Court in a related case struck down imprisonment of these admittedly loyal American citizens. But long after the fact. The Commission found that the main Impetus leading to the exclusion order was the mistaken notion that individuals of Japanese descent would be loyal to Japan, not to the United States, and groundless fears of fifth column activity even though no evidence of such activities could be uncovered. The Commission stated that "the record does not permit the conclusion that military necessity warranted the exclusion of the ethnic Japanese from the west coast." After exclusion became official policy, the War Relocation Authority [WRA1—the civilian agency charged with supervising the relocation—assumed that the vast majority of evacuees were loyal and should be allowed to resettle outside of the west coast. But because of harsh objections from certain mountain State politicians, a consensus plan for detention of the evacuees emerged. The WRA gave up on Its Idea of resettlement, and accepted a program of confinement. Despite WRA'5 belief that evacuees should be returned to normal productive life, it had, In effect, become their Jailer. Since there was no military Justification for detention, the WRA Instead contended that the program was for the evacuees' own safety. The history of life during the evacuation and In the relocation camps Is one of suffering and deprivation. On the average, families received only 1 or 2 weeks notice of evacuation to an unknown destination. They could take v, ith them only what could be carried. All else was lost or sold for cut-rate prices. Life in the relocation camps was spartan, with shoddy and crowded buildings, defective facilities, faulty heating, inadequate health care, and limited education programs. Privacy was Impossible. Families and individuals alike lost their Identities and became known only by identification numbers. Because the Western Defense Command opposed Individual loyalty reviews—for fear of weakening the blanket exclusion—no opportunity for Individual review was created In the assembly centers. The War Department fsvored conducting loyalty reviews, but did not act on this until the end of 1942. Although these reviews eventually permitted some to leave relocation centers, it didn't end the exclusion from the west coast. Moreover, even this belated process was offensive, since It treated Japanese Americans as guilty until proven Innocent. In the spring of 1943, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, and Gen. George C. Marshall reached the conclusion that the loyalty reviews eliminated any Justification for exclusion from the west coast. They kept their views private, however, and General DeWitt repeatedly opposed ending exclusion until he left the Western Defense Command in late 1943, as did west coast anti-Japanese fractions. Secretary Stimson finally put the recommendation before the Cabinet in May 1944. But no action was taken until December 7. 1944, while confinement continued for the great majority of Japanese Americans. The exclusion and removal of Japanese-Americans resulted from a long history of anti-Japanese-American agitation and legislation on the west coast. By contrast, In Hawaii, where the military commander restrained plans for radical measures and treated the ethnic Japanese as loyal residents—absent evidence to the contrary—only 2,000 ethnic Japanese were taken into custody. The policy developed was in sharp contrast to Government actions against enemy aliens or citizens of non-Japanese descent. For example, the United States never ordered a mass exclusion or detention against American citizens of German or Italian descent. This episode in American history should never have happened. It's the Government's responsibility to set the record straight and to try, at least, tc recognize and partially compensate for past injustices, although the tarnish on our Constitution can never be completely removed. Our purpose is to recognize and redress the injustices and violations of civil liberties against U.S. citizens and U.S. residents of Japanese and Aleut ancestry by the United States and to discourage similar Injustices and violations of civil liberties in the future. The bill provides for the establishment of a $1.5 billion trust fund from which individual payments to the surviving internees would be made. Those eligible are people of Japanese or Alaskan Aleut ancestry excluded from the west coast between December 7, 1941, and June 30. 1946. or deprived of liberty or property as a result of a series of Executive orders, proclamations, laws. Armed Forces directives, or other Federal actions resulting in exclusion, relocation, and/or detention of individuals on the basis of race. The remaining moneys In the trust fund would be utilized for humanitarian and public education efforts to preclude this event from occurring again in the future. This act is a Just and fair redress to those Individuals who were excluded and/or interned without justification. In gross violation of their civil liberties as American citizens and residents. I urge my colleagues to support It |